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Abstract 
This paper summarizes some of the major issues related to group decision modeling. We briefly 
review the existing work on group choice models in marketing and consumer research. We draw 
some generalizations about which models work well when and use those generalizations to provide 
guidelines for future research. 
Groups pervade virtually every aspect of our lives. We belong to families, work 
cohorts, clubs, church groups, and professional organizations among others. We 
do many things in groups too. We make decisions; we travel; we play games; we 
work; we consume. In the early 1970s researchers in marketing and consumer 
decision making realized through studying families and organizational buying cen- 
ters that the group was an important unit of analysis (Davis 1970, 1976; Webster 
and Wind 1972). It was not until almost a decade later that we, as a discipline, 
started to propose and test formal models of group decision making. 
This paper summarizes some major issues related to group decision modeling. 
The major questions addressed include “What have we done,” “What have we 
learned?” “ What do we need to do to learn more?” and “How do we go about 
learning?” In the past decade or so a fair amount of effort has been exerted in the 
proposal and empirical testing of group choice models. By and large, each model 
worked quite well in the setting in which it was tested. However, it seems that no 
single class of models is appropriate for all problems. “What we have done” then 
is propose and test a wide variety of group choice models. “What we have 
learned” is that each mode1 seems to work well in the setting for which it was 
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designed. Consequently, we have gained some preliminary insight as to which 
models work well when. Further resolution of this issue awaits the development 
of future models. Clearly, new models we develop will work well in situations 
current models do not. “What we have to do” then is continue to develop new 
models and refine the answers to the “which model works well when question.” 
This paper begins by briefly reviewing the group choice modeling literature in 
marketing/consumer choice. We then draw generalizations about the conditions 
under which certain models may be most appropriate. These characterizations 
are inferred from the experimental results reported in the literature. We next sug- 
gest what types of models need to be pursued and propose specific guidelines for 
where to look for them. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of data col- 
lection issues. 
1. Group choice models in marketing 
The first formal group choice modeling efforts in marketing were those of Chof- 
fray and Lilien (1976: 1980). Borrowing from Davis’s (1973) Social Decision 
Scheme theory, they proposed four different models, each of which corresponds 
to a different conceptualization of the interaction mechanism within groups. In- 
dividual choice probabilities are mapped into group choice probabilities by an 
algebraic rule which reflects the nature of how groups decide (e.g. vote, choose a 
member at random to make the decision, look for a minimum number of members 
to approve of an alternative, or look for an alternative that least perturbs the 
preferences of all the group members). The Choffray and Lilien models are rela- 
tively unique in the marketing literature in their focus on the interaction mecha- 
nism. Most of the others simply focus on predicting outcomes and consequently 
are accompanied by an empirical test of some sort. 
There appear to be two categories of predictive models in the literature, para- 
morphic linear and normative. Linear models were first introduced simply as par- 
amorphic predictive tools. Groups were assumed to behave as if they followed a 
linear model. It did not matter that groups did not actually behave according to a 
linear model; it only mattered that the linear model predicted well. It should be 
noted that paramorphic models do not need to be linear. It just happens that most 
of the models we use are. In contrast, the original intent behind normative models 
was to describe behavior that reasonable, rational people should follow. This may 
be very different from describing what people actually do. However, to the extent 
that people subscribe to the rational underpinnings of the normative models, these 
models can describe what people actually do. Thus, they are also potential pre- 
dictive tools. 
In a very important sense, however, the distinction between linear and norma- 
tive models is artificial. There is a normative characterization of the linear model. 
(cf. Keeney and Kirkwood 197.5; Keeney and Raiffa 1976). However, with two 
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exceptions (Eliashberg et. al. 1986; Rao and Steckel, forthcoming), those who 
have used these models simply use linear models in a paramorphic sense. 
1 .I, Linear models 
Linear models of group choice represent a group’s preference as a weighted sum 
of the individual’s preferences. Although these models have used different mea- 
sures of preference (e.g. utility, choice probability), the interesting components of 
these models are the weights themselves and not what they combine. 
Early in this stream, a number of authors suggested that equal weights be used 
as a starting point. Curry and Menasco (1979) prove that equal weights result in 
a group (husband-wife dyad in their case) selecting the alternative that maximizes 
their total joint utility. Krishnamurthi (1981) performed an experiment in which 
equal weight models predicted quite well relative to those that were differentially 
weighted. 
Nevertheless, equal weights assume that all group members have equal impacts 
on the outcomes of a group’s decision. This is simply not true in most cases. 
Therefore, other researchers have turned their attention toward finding more re- 
liable ways to estimate differential weights (cf. Steckel, Lehmann, and Corfman 
1988; Steckel and O’Shaughnessy 1989) or uncovering the factors which differ- 
entiate the weights (Corfman and Lehmann 1987; Rao and Steckel, forthcoming). 
These efforts have all shown significant predictive improvements over the equal 
weight model. 
Linear models have been tested in a wide variety of contexts; M.B.A. and 
spouse job choices (Krishnamurthi 1981), husband-wife durable and service 
choices (Corfman and Lehmann 1987), ad-hoc dyads’ selections of music pieces 
and common stocks (Steckel, Lehmann, and Corfman 1988), organizational buy- 
ing behavior (Steckel and O’Shaughnessy 1989), marketing faculty choosing 
among potential hires and undergraduates deciding on restaurants (Rao and 
Steckel, forthcoming), and a manufacturer-retailer negotiation experiment 
(Eliashberg etal. 1986). In all cases, linear models appeared to achieve an ac- 
ceptable level of performance. 
I .2. Normative models 
Normative models of group choice postulate sets of principles which reflect fair- 
ness and/or efficiency. Model builders argue that group choices, preferences, 
choice probabilities, and utility functions should follow these principles. The prin- 
ciples are mathematicized as axioms so that a solution characterized by them can 
be derived in an analytically elegant way. Of course the precise solution depends 
on the original set of principles (axioms). However all solutions retain the nor- 
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mative spirit. They determine ‘correct’ or “appropriate’ decisions. Thus, these 
solutions provide a reasonable benchmark for descriptive modeling. 
Most marketers who have studied group choices and explicitly recognized nor- 
mative traditions have borrowed their models from the theory of cooperative 
games. The theory of cooperative games can be divided into the two-person bar- 
gaining problem and the more general n-person game. 
The most prominent effort in the bargaining literature is that of Nash (1950). 
The conflict point, sometimes called the no settlement point or status quo, is an 
integral concept to Nash’s theory. This point is a default outcome which the bar- 
gainers must accept if they are unable to reach an agreement. Nash proposed the 
following set of axioms that the outcome should obey (cf. Lute and Raiffa 19.57, 
pp. 124-134; Neslin and Greenhalgh 1983, p. 370): 
1. Individual Rationality - Both players should be better off at the outcome than 
they would at the conflict point; 
2. Feasibility - The outcome should be chosen from the set of possible outcomes 
of the negotiation; 
3. Independence of Utility Function Scale - The outcome should not depend on 
how utility is measured; 
4. Pareto Optimality - No other settlement which both bargainers prefer should 
exist; 
5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives - If X is the outcome of a bargaining 
situation, it should also be the outcome of any situation where the possible 
outcomes are a subset (including X) of the original ones; and 
6. Symmetry - If the set of feasible outcomes is symmetric (i.e. if one alternative 
has a utility distribution a,b for the two bargainers, than another has a distri- 
bution b,a), then the outcomes will provide both bargainers with equal utility. 
These imply that the solution be the Pareto optimal outcome that maximizes the 
product of each party’s gains over the conflict point. Other solution concepts have 
modified Nash; but all use his framework as a point of departure (cf. Gupta and 
Livne 1988; Kalai and Smordinsky 1975). 
Neslin and Greenhalgh (1983; 1986) tested the predictive validity of the Nash 
bargaining scheme in a simulated media purchase. They found (1983) that Nash’s 
theory predicts very well in the aggregate. However, when applied to individual 
dyads, the theory only predicted 42 percent of the outcomes (1986). Furthermore, 
Neslin and Greenhalgh could not find any effect of situational power or bargaining 
skill on the outcomes of bargaining situations. They did find, however, that Nash’s 
solution was more predictive when subjects viewed the negotiation as a one-shot 
deal rather than as a continuing relationship. They also found that Nash solutions 
were reached more often when the seller was on commission. 
Only one study has appeared to this point which employs the more general n- 
person theory. Steckel(l990) tested one solution concept from this literature, the 
Core (the set of alternatives which cannot be defeated by any other in a simple 
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majority rule vote), in a mergers and acquisitions majority rule experiment. He 
found it to predict quite well. 
Game theory experiments are traditionally tailored to the solution concept they 
are testing. Neslin and Greenhalgh’s experiments are explicitly set up as bargain- 
ing situations. Steckel informed his subjects that any decision endorsed by a ma- 
jority of the group would be accepted. The interpretations of the experimental 
results are usually framed as “The model works in settings for which it is appro- 
priate.” In contrast, experiments which test linear models are usually very vague 
in structure. Group members are left to their own devices to come up with a 
decision. This is not so much a criticism of game theory models and experiments 
as it is a testimony to the robustness of linear models. 
2. Which model works when and why? 
In essence, this the main question we need to answer in future years. We are at a 
point of development where we can make preliminary generalizations about an- 
swers to some aspects of this question and assert strong hypotheses about others. 
Hypothesis: Linear models work well in almost all circumstances. 
This is well-known in individual choice (cf. Johnson and Meyer 1984); but the 
statement is no less valid in group choice (Corfman and Lehmann 1987; Curry 
and Menasco 1979; Menasco and Curry 1989; Rao and Steckel, forthcoming; and 
Steckel, and Lehmann and Corfman 1988). 
Dawes and Corrigan (1974) suggest certain conditions under which linear 
models provide adequate representations. These include: “(a) each input variable 
has a conditionally monotone relationship with the output; (b) there is error of 
measurement; and (c) deviations from optimal weighting do not make much prac- 
tical difference (p.93.” These conditions all apply to the group decision problem. 
Condition (a) holds if, whenever an individual within a group is more favorably 
disposed towards an alternative, the group will be too. While this might not hold 
in every case (e.g. an obnoxious member who offends the remainder of the group), 
it certainly does in the vast majority. Condition (b) holds as along as we are sad- 
dled with imperfections in our preference measures (which we probably always 
will be). Finally, condition (c) will only be violated when the individuals within a 
group have negatively correlated preferences. This will occur in any problem that 
can be modelled as a zero-sum game. However, if there is some degree of agree- 
ment within a group, almost any linear combination of member utilities will pro- 
duce the same ordering. 
Examination of condition (c) also demonstrates why equal weights work rea- 
sonably well in predicting group judgments (Einhorn, Hogarth, and Klemperer 
1979). Rarely will there be total and complete disagreement among group mem- 
bers. And even in those cases in which it does occur, equal weighting prohibits 
“mistakes”; i.e. placing more weight on the less important individual. 
For all their success however, linear models are far from the final word. We 
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know this empirically. In experiments directly comparing them to Nash’s bargain- 
ing scheme (Eliashberg et. al. 1986) and the Core, from cooperative game theory 
(Steckel 1990), linear models came out second best. The reasons for this have 
been alluded to previously. Like Neslin and Greenhalgh (1983, 1986), Eliashberg 
et. al.‘s experiment was explicitly designed to be a bargaining one. Steckel’s ex- 
periments were constructed to examine majority rule decisions, those for which 
the Core is best designed. Thus, ‘The model works in settings for which it is 
appropriate’ conclusion applies. We therefore make the following assertion. 
Assertion: If group decisions have a formal structure (e.g. bargaining, majority 
rule, etc.), models that account for this structure will outpredict those that do not. 
Linear models suffer from the limitation that they ignore some fundamental 
behavioral aspects of group decision making that have been discovered through 
behavioral research (Hare I976), such as informational influences or social com- 
parisons. They are therefore limited in their ability to describe and explain group 
processes. It follows then that (new) models which incorporate these phenomena 
should have an advantage in prediction (Menasco and Curry 1989). 
This is implicit in Choffray and Lilien’s (1976, 1980) reliance on specific inter- 
action mechanisms in their modeling efforts. 
Assertion : Models which incorporate behavioral reality should outpredict 
those that do not. 
The behavioral phenomena to be included will usually.depend on the domain 
of the decision process being studied (e.g. role structure may be important in 
certain situations where individuals differ in terms of their expertise about sepa- 
rate aspects of the decision). Certain group decision making phenomena, how- 
ever, are quite pervasive. For example, extensive evidence exists that group dis- 
cussion generally produces attitudes which are more extreme in the direction of 
the average of the prediscussion attitudes in a wide variety of situations. This 
phenomenon is called the group polarization hypothesis (Myers and Lamm 1976). 
Rao and Steckel (forthcoming) have modified the linear model to account for po- 
tential polarization. They demonstrate the superiority of the modified model. 
Principle 3 is also illustrated in the bargaining literature. For example, the 
Gupta-Livne (1988) bargaining model adds some prominent “reference” outcome 
that can have an effect on the outcome. This is analogous to the no settlement 
conflict point in the Nash solution. The different is that it is an obvious settlement 
which can be adopted which leaves both parties better off. Indeed, Gupta and 
Livne (1990) have shown in a buyer-seller bargaining experiment that, when such 
a point exists, the Gupta-Livne solution outpredicts the Nash solution. 
3. Future directions 
The future of group choice modeling can be inferred from the three conclusions 
above. Linear models work (conclusion 1). But how can we improve upon them? 
The answer we suggest here is either by tailoring the model to the type of decision 
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being studied (conclusion 2) or by building models that incorporate empirically 
observed behavioral realities (conclusion 3). The wide variety of decisions with 
which groups are faced and the plethora of phenomena observed by behavioral 
scientists suggest that the small library of models we have accumulated is only a 
beginning. We need more. 
Where will these new models come from? Two possibilities exist. We can either 
borrow them or build them ourselves. We have had great success by borrowing 
up to this point. Linear models came from social psychology. Bargaining models 
came from economics and mathematics. Certainly, we have not exhausted the 
social sciences. They have models and approaches which explicitly account for 
the type of decision and/or behavioral reality. Two examples are the economic 
theory of teams and case-based reasoning. 
The economic theory of teams (Marschak and Radnor 1972) is an example of 
an approach that accounts for type of decision. In this theory, a team is a group 
of persons who must make a set of decisions to further their common interests. 
Furthermore, the members of the team have no interests besides the common 
ones. In operational terms, they all subscribe to the same payoff or utility func- 
tion. Team theory’s strength is that it concentrates on three main issues: (1) what 
information should team members collect about their ‘uncertain’ environment, (2) 
whether and how they should communicate this information to their colleagues, 
and (3) how each individual should react to the information he/she receives 
(MacCrimmon 1974). 
The team theory framework seems to provide a viable approach to modeling a 
strategic planning committee. A forecasting specialist may make judgments about 
the growth rates of various markets, a finance specialist can make sure that all 
sources and uses of funds balance, and a lawyer can comment on the legal rami- 
fications of a strategy. Each committee member would require a different set of 
information and take a different (set of) action(s). The critical factor in this group 
situation is the lack of conflict of interest. In principle, each member of the com- 
mittee is in focussed on the goal of maximizing long term profits for the firm. In 
practice, however, the team approach may break down if individuals have their 
own hidden agendas. 
Behavioral reality can be incorporated through artificial intelligence procedures 
which systematically represent the steps in human information processing. One 
such approach called case-based reasoning (CBR) has been developed by psy- 
chologists and computer scientists. Groups use their experiences in previous sit- 
uations to aid them in current decisions. CBR models decisions in this way (cf. 
Kolodner 1984; 1990). The central focus is the retrieval of analogous cases (ex- 
periences) for use in decision making as opposed to the implementation of known 
rules. The CBR research paradigm usually terminates in a computer model that 
simulates a decision process. Algorithms are created which interpret the problem 
at hand, recall previous cases, select those that are most relevant, propose an 
initial ‘ballpark’ solution, adapt it, and justify, criticize, and evaluate the result. 
Finally, the current situation is added to the library of experience contained in the 
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computer’s memory. The quality of the resulting model depends on the cases 
stored in its memory and the adeptness of the algorithms that manipulate the case 
information. 
Certainly application of approaches such as team theory and CBR to consumer 
and marketing group decision making problems would constitute viable research 
projects. We should not, however, be constrained by the models available in other 
literatures. The situations and phenomena we model do not necessarily have an- 
alogs in other literatures. It would be foolish to dismiss prior work from other 
disciplines as a guide in this task. Two recent efforts (Gupta and Livne 1989; Rao 
and Steckel, forthcoming) have taken existing models and modified them to ex- 
plicitly account for the phenomena they were interested in. This may continue to 
be a fruitful path. But as marketers and consumer researchers, we need to be more 
creative, to become more oriented to “model building” than simply “ ‘model test- 
ing.” We need to identify situations and phenomena, and build models which ex- 
plicitly incorporate them. 
4. Other issues 
This paper has focussed on modeling issues. Modeling, however, is only one of 
several problems group researchers encounter. One special difficulty they have is 
how to get good data. The CBR approach is actually more of a data collection 
procedure than modeling approach since the focus is on the collection and use of 
data. However, it is not appropriate for all types of model building research. More 
conventional data sources and collection vehicles are needed. Unfortunately, in 
vivo groups are virtually impossible to observe. It has also proven difficult to 
collect more than a very few observations from a group within a single session in 
a laboratory experiment. Furthermore, the decision process is likely to vary from 
decision to decision, at least with respect to relative influence (Corfman and Leh- 
mann 1987: Steckel, Lehmann, and Corfman 1988). Therefore, it may be very 
difficult to collect more than a single observation from any single decision pro- 
cess. Corfman (1990) details a number of other problems with collecting experi- 
mental data from groups. 
Sources of nonexperimental data would be very valuable to those who wish to 
model group decision making. One context where this appears to be possible is 
residential real estate purchasing. Offers and responses tend to be made through 
third party. In principle, these could be recorded and used to build models and 
test hypotheses about buyer-seller negotiations. A complete data base might in- 
clude demographics and prior preferences of the seller, the intermediary, and each 
family member. The resulting knowledge can be used to either test bargaining 
models or perhaps even build an expert system for the negotiation process similar 
in spirit to the CBR approach. 
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